
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Gender and Competition
IZA DP No. 4300
July 2009
Alison L. Booth 




Alison L. Booth 
Australian National University, 















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  









Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
















In almost all European Union countries, the gender wage gap is increasing across the wages 
distribution. In this lecture I briefly survey some recent studies aiming to explain why 
apparently identical women and men receive such different returns and focus especially on 
those incorporating pyschological factors as an explanation of the gender gap. Research 
areas with high potential returns to further analysis are identified. Several examples from my 
own recent experimental work with Patrick Nolen are also presented. These try to distinguish 
between the role of nature and nurture in affecting behavioural differences between men and 
women that might lead to gender wage gaps. 
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Measuring the gender wage gap has occupied applied labour economists for decades and 
unfortunately the wage gap is not withering away.
2 Moreover a recently-established stylised fact 
is that, in almost all European Union countries for which we have harmonised data, this gender 
wage gap is increasing across the wages distribution. The different returns received by men and 
women to the same characteristics are often interpreted as measuring the “discrimination” that 
women face in the labour market. This discrimination – or differential returns to the same 
characteristics – has been viewed until relatively recently as a “black box” of labour economics. 
We really want to know more about what explains why apparently identical women and men 
receive different returns. In this lecture I briefly survey some recent studies addressing this issue, 
including work aiming to incorporate pyschological factors as an explanation of the gender gap, 
and highlight research areas with high potential returns to further analysis. I then present several 
examples from my own recent experimental work with Patrick Nolen that tries to distinguish 
between the role of nature and nurture in affecting behavioural differences between men and 
women that might lead to gender wage gaps (Booth and Nolen, 2008a, 2008b). 
 
2. The gender pay gap and the glass ceiling 
Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman (2003) show that in Sweden the gender pay gap is increasing 
across the wages distribution, and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) find a similar result in 
                                                 
2 See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) for a recent meta-analysis of gender wage gaps and Azmat, Guell 
and Manning (2006) for a study of gender gaps in unemployment rates in OECD countries. 2 
 
ten of the eleven other European countries they examined.
3  Table 1 summarizes the 
Arulampalam et al. (2007) estimates of the gender wage gap in the private sector. The data are 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), collected annually since 1994 in a 
standardized format facilitating cross-country comparisons.
4  
Insert Table 1 near here. 
The first column of Table 1 gives the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the mean 
gender wage gap, while the remaining columns give the quantile regression (QR) estimates 
calculated following the Machado and Mata (2005) decomposition method. The calculated wage 
gap measures the effect of different returns to men and women when women’s attributes were 
used in the counterfactual decomposition. The OLS estimates reveal that, in the private sector, 
the average gender wage gap varies from around 12% in Denmark, up to 25% in Britain and 
Austria. But averages disguise the differences across the wages distribution revealed by the QR 
estimates. These show that, even when men and women have the same characteristics, there is 
typically a positive and increasing gender gap across the wages distribution due to different 
returns. In all countries except Spain, the private sector gender wage gap is highest at the 90
th 
percentile. The country with the highest wage gap at the 90
th percentile is Britain, followed by 
France and then Finland. The biggest gap between the 10
th and the 90
th percentile is found in the 
                                                 
3 The exception was Spain. Using the same data source, de la Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2008) disaggregate the 
Spanish data and find the gender wage gap is increasing across the distribution for highly educated workers only. It 
is interesting that, in Australia, Kee (2006) and Baron and Cobb-Clark (2008) find that the gender pay gap  is 
constant in the public sector and increasing across the wages distribution only in the private sector.  
4 The authors estimated each specification separately by country, gender and sector (public and private). I report 
only the private sector estimates here, although similar findings are found in the public sector. 3 
 
Netherlands. This phenomenon - of a gender pay gap that increases across the wages distribution 
and accelerates in the upper tail – is labelled a ‘glass ceiling’ effect.
5  
Although the gender pay gap is biggest at the top of the wage distribution, there does not 
seem to be any compelling a priori theoretical reason why this should be the case. Indeed, there 
are reasons why it might widen at the bottom. For example, women towards the bottom might 
have less bargaining power or be more subject to firm’s market power than comparable men. 
This could be due to unobservable family commitments, or to social custom whereby a man’s 
career takes precedence. Alternatively, at the bottom of the wages distribution minimum wage 
compliance may be unequal across gender, or trade unions might differentially represent the 
interests of their female and male workers. The situation where the gender pay gap widens at the 
bottom of the wage distribution is defined in Arulampalam et al (2007) as a sticky floor. The 
estimates reported in Table 1 provide some evidence of sticky floors only in Italy and France.  
The availability of harmonised cross-country datasets has allowed researchers not only to 
chart variations in wage gaps across countries but also to explore the role of policies and 
institutions in explaining such variations (see Blau and Kahn, 1992, 1996, 2003; Arulampalam et 
al., 2007).  This approach has focused on disentangling the contribution of gender-specific 
policies and of general wage-setting institutions to variations in the gender wage gap.
  The 
general conclusion of these studies is that, while institutions such as gender-specific policies do 
explain some of the cross-country variation, they do not explain why the gap and the glass ceiling 
exist.
6  
                                                 
5 Albrecht et al. (2003), who used 1998 Swedish data to show that the gender pay gap is increasing across the wages 
distribution and accelerating in the upper tail, were the first to find this phenomenon and to label it as a ‘glass 
ceiling’ effect. 
6 For example, Arulampalam et al. (2007) estimated cross-country correlations between the OECD (2001) work-
family reconciliation index and (a) sticky floors defined as the 10-50 pay difference; (b) glass ceilings defined as the 
90-50 pay difference. The work-family index was negatively correlated with sticky floors and positively correlated 
with glass-ceilings, and both were statistically significant. Thus countries with more “generous” work-family 4 
 
3. Interpreting gender gaps 
A fundamental challenge for labour economists is to identify the extent to which observed 
gender differences in labour market outcomes for apparently identical men and women are due to 
discrimination, to other unobservable factors, or to intrinsic differences between men and 
women. The cross-country analyses are not really able to deal with this, though they do offer 
very useful suggestive evidence on correlations between policy and institutions on the one hand, 
and gender wage gaps on the other. 
Do gender wage gaps and glass ceilings arise on the demand-side through discriminatory 
practices? Or does unobserved heterogeneity on the supply-side explain gender wage gaps 
better? In my lecture I use a demand-side and supply-side framework, but this can obscure 
factors affecting both workers and employers and should therefore be interpreted mainly as a 
convenient organizing structure. Next I briefly review potential causes that have been explored in 
the literature. 
   Expectations of family formation and fertility are private information and evolve slowly 
over time.
7 Employers base their behaviour on averages. For this reason women may not get pay 
increases, they may not get promoted when they deserve to, and they may not get offered the 
jobs they deserve. But is statistical discrimination the only explanation of these wage gaps that 
are widening over the wages distribution? Unfortunately, it is hard to distinguish statistical or 
other forms of discrimination from alternative hypotheses. However it is helpful to review some 
relevant studies in the recent literature. 
                                                                                                                                                             
policies have a lower wage gap at the bottom of the wages distribution and a wider gap at the top. They concluded 
that family-friendly policies could be a double-edged sword. See also Datta Gupta, Smith and Verner (2006). 
7 For an historical overview of gender differences in US college enrollments and how these relate to a variety of 
influences - including expectations of labour force participation - see Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2006). See also 
Goldin (1990). 5 
 
First, women’s willingness to pursue outside offers and their ability to accept these may 
differ from that of men, reinforcing their poorer position in the labour market. Moreover, many 
labour markets are hierarchical, and promotions and appointments procedures can widen gender 
pay gaps.  While promotions are typically subject to well-defined procedures, especially in larger 
organisations, exactly where in the rank-specific salary scale a successful candidate is appointed 
can depend on discrimination on the demand-side and individual negotiation skills in addition to 
experience on the supply-side (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2003).
8 If, towards the top of the 
wages distribution, promotions procedures favour men rather than women, then the gender pay 
gap might be bigger towards the top.  Moreover, promotion criteria can act to perpetuate gender 
gaps. Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) show, in their study of US law firms, how criteria for 
promotion like excessively long hours of work can widen gender pay gaps towards the top of the 
lawyers’ wage distribution.  
Whether such criteria were devised to measure hard-to-observe output at a time when the 
workforce was largely male, or were a deliberate ploy designed to keep out women, remains a 
topic for debate. Institutional arrangements (such as the particular form of the tenure system of 
US academia) were also largely designed with men in mind and could be viewed as 
anachronistic for a mixed gender workforce, producing outcomes that may be orthogonal to the 
original intent. Ginther and Kahn (2004) provide an extensive analysis of this in the context of 
US tenure and its implications for female academic economists, implications which surely 
cannot have been intended when such arrangements were set in place. 
                                                 
8 Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2005), using data on promotions from the British Household Panel Survey, found 
that women gained less from promotions than did men, but that women were as likely as men to get promoted. In 
contrast, Cobb-Clark (2001) found, using NLSY data, that young women in the US were less likely to be promoted 
but had higher wage growth subsequent to promotion. 6 
 
Organizational sociology highlights the phenomenon of ‘presenteeism’, whereby excessively 
long hours might emerge as part of the culture of the job but might not actually be required for 
efficiency (Simpson, 1998). These can be used to limit female access to these jobs.
9  Furthermore 
covert cultural values can pervade a particular organization, and may make women less inclined 
to apply for promotion. Kanter (1977) argues that gender differences in attitudes and behaviour 
within an organization arise because of differences in numbers and positions in the power 
structure. Others such as Lipman-Blumen (1976) posit instead that they arise because of social 
preferences for being surrounded by members of one’s own gender. That males in female-
dominated occupations might be adversely affected has rarely been considered in the economics 
literature (Riach and Rich, 2006; Booth and Leigh, 2008). However the greater the sex-ratio in 
any group, the more likely is any minority newcomer to be perceived stereotypically.
10 
Prejudice or discrimination at the hiring stage can also matter because it can affect 
women’s willingness to bargain over offered wages – an example of the interaction of demand 
and supply factors. Suppose that women have a lower probability of being offered a particular 
job – for instance playing in an orchestra. Goldin and Rouse (2000) demonstrated that blind 
audition procedures can result in a higher proportion of female members of symphony 
orchestras. Although the authors did not address relative salaries, consider the following 
scenario. Assume a woman has overcome the hiring barrier for the organisation where she 
wishes to work and has actually got offered a job. Given this is hard – hiring procedures are not 
                                                 
9 The sociological literature emphasises the role of ‘gatekeepers’ who practice nepotism or discrimination before the 
point at which it would be caught by Equal Opportunities rules. Reskin (1993) notes that reliance on informal 
networks for recruitment may adversely affect women to the extent that these networks are sex-segregated. A recent 
study by van den Brink and Benschop (2008) of recruitment of professors into Dutch academia documents the 
prevalence of closed procedures whereby ‘scouts’ recruit academics, a process that can be very ‘gendered’ if the 
dominant group only networks with individuals from the same group. 
10 Some recent economics research, to be discussed below, explores how the sex-ratio of experimental groups 
(where subjects are randomly assigned to single-sex or coed groups) affects subjects’ choices; see Gneezy, Niederle, 
and Rustichini (2003), Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003), Booth and Nolen (2009a, b). But this research has 
not looked at new entrants or the role of the timing of new entrants. 7 
 
always impartial, as Goldin and Rouse demonstrated -  the woman may be so grateful for the job 
offer that she will not bargain as aggressively as comparable men for her starting salary. The 
book by Babcock and Laschever (2003) - Women Don’t Ask - has numerous instances of 
interviewed women who were in exactly this situation. 
Gender differences in willingness to bargain over wages would have to become more 
important towards the top of the wage distribution for this hypothesis to contribute to explaining 
the glass ceiling effect.  It is possible that women towards the bottom have their wages set by 
pay-bargaining awards while those towards the top have their wages set by individual 
negotiation. If this is the case, then the fact that “women don’t ask” could contribute to the glass 
ceiling. Babcock and Laschever (2003) provide a battery of evidence from psychology studies 
and their own interviews with women to support their thesis that women are unwilling to bargain 
on their own account, although being very competent at doing so for others. Babcock and 
Laschever argue that historically women were accustomed to work without pay at a type of work 
devalued by every objective financial measure – home production. Hence women are relatively 
unaccustomed to evaluating their time and abilities in economic terms.
11  
The example of hiring into the orchestra serves to emphasise the potential importance of 
bargaining. It is well known from bargaining theory that an individual’s share of the cake in a 
bargained outcome is increasing in his or her fall-back option, as well as increasing in the weight 
given to each agent’s net gain to reaching a bargain.
12 If women are less likely to get outside 
offers, then they are in a weaker position with regard to bargaining with the firm, since their 
                                                 
11 They suggest negotiation courses to help women to bargain over pay, and argue that companies could benefit from 
adopting affirmative action, not least since it would reduce turnover. They cite the experience of the accountancy 
and consulting firm Deloitte and Touche, who in 1991 decided to embark on cultural change in favour of women. 
This makes a fascinating case study of how within-company attitudes towards women can be changed. 
12 Recall that the solution to the generalized Nash bargaining model is the weighted product of the two parties net 
gain to reaching an agreement. Thus the weighting parameter – as well as the fall-back option – affect the negotiated 
outcome. 8 
 
outside option is lower. Moreover, if they are less skilled at individual bargaining on their own 
behalf – perhaps because it conflicts with some notion of female identity –  the weighting 
parameter will be lower. 
But why then do employers not compete to make greater profits by hiring women with weak 
bargaining power and lower outside offers, thereby driving up their wages? This question takes 
us back to the taste-based employer discrimination model of Becker (1971). Since that time, 
economists have become much more willing to ask how preferences have formed, drawing on 
insights from other disciplines like psychology and sociology. Employers’ tastes for 
discrimination may arise because of ‘homosocial’ preferences, defined by Lipman-Blumen 
(1976) as the social preference for being with members of one’s own gender without any 
implication of erotic attraction. In other words, men may feel more comfortable being 
surrounded by men.
13 This has some similarities to the nepotism argument developed by 
Goldberg (1983). In that model, firms gain utility from working with a particular group of 
workers and nepotistic firms can coexist with other firms in the long run.
14  
Until recently there has been remarkably little empirical research by economists on how 
employers’ gender role attitudes vary with gender. Although audit studies are important 
measures of hiring discrimination, they typically do not establish the gender of those making 
hiring decisions although there are some exceptions.
15 The disciplines of sociology and psychology  
have important insights that could be useful to economists modelling preference formation.  An 
example of the former is provided by Ridgeway (1993), who explores how gender stereotypes are 
                                                 
13 Lipman-Blumen (1976) notes that this same-sex interest or homosociality is reinforced by a stratification system 
in which men and all-male institutions have had almost exclusive access to major resources, and that the dominance 
order among men is based upon control of resources. See also Britton (1990) and also Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
who also mention the notion of men fearing to lose their masculinity when women are working in the same job as 
they are. 
14 A recent survey of literature on this theme can be found in Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007). 
15 For a useful survey, see Riach  and Rich (2002), and for recent studies see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004),  
Carlsson and Rooth. (2007) and Booth and Leigh (2008).  9 
 
cued by gender categorization. In the psychological literature, the role congruity model of Eagly and 
Karau (2002) aims to explain why women are discriminated in some roles but not in others. They 
suggest that perceived incongruity between the female “communal” gender role and the 
“agentic” leadership role results in two forms of prejudice. First, women are perceived less 
favourably than men as potential leaders. And second, if women do manage to obtain a position 
of leadership they are then evaluated less favourably because they do not fit society’s 
prescriptions of what is appropriate behaviour for women. This ambivalence can produce a 
variety of effects that may make it harder for women to achieve positions of leadership.
16 Some 
evidence of this was found in the recent experimental study by Beaman et al. (2008), which 
showed that first-time women leaders received worse evaluations despite outperforming male 
counterparts on many performance dimensions. However in that study exposure to female 
leaders tended to reduce prejudice, and second-time leaders were rated as for men. 
  How are such prejudices formed? Social custom and conditioning - in particular gender 
identity as argued by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Eagly and Karau (2002) - may influence 
preferences for employee-type. According to the gender identity hypothesis, individuals operate 
within society’s constraints and their utility may be powerfully affected by social custom and 
conditioning. One only has to consider the Taliban’s attitudes to women to see this. Society's 
prescriptions about appropriate modes of behaviour for each gender might result in women and 
men experiencing a loss of identity should they deviate from the relevant code. If this is the case, 
male bosses might be happier employing men to higher-ranking posts, since both are then 
                                                 
16 Women obtaining leadership roles may thus elicit negative reactions, even while receiving some positive evaluation for 
achieving this role. This mix of positive and negative evaluations – or ambivalence - “is inherent in the epithets often applied to 
powerful women, such as dragon lady and Battle-Ax (Tannen, 1994) ... Margaret Thatcher, British prime minister, … was 
labeled not only as “Iron Lady” but also as “Her Malignancy” and “Attila the Hen” (Genovese, 1993). To the extent that a 
woman who fulfills a leader role elicits a mixture of positive and negative reactions—that is, an ambivalent reaction—storage of 
these reactions in memory could have a variety of effects. As attitude researchers have shown, ambivalence can produce less 
consistency in expressions of an attitude across time and situations and a propensity for reactions to polarize—that is, become 
very negative or even sometimes very positive—depending on the particulars of the judgment.” (Eagly and Karau, 2002: 576.)  10 
 
adopting modes of behavior dictated by social custom. Of course these prescriptions are 
endogenous to a society, as noted by thinkers such as John Stuart Mill (1869). Prescriptions 
might arise and continue because it is in the dominant group's interest to maintain them (see also 
Lipman-Blumen, 1976, and Seabright, 2005). They can be weakened or removed when this 
group loses power. For example, the female suffrage movement can be viewed as a movement 
aiming to remove the prescription that women were not capable of voting responsibly.   
How does the gender identity model affect the gender wage gap?
17 If individuals do feel a 
loss of identity by deviating from a particular prescription of predominantly men in power, we 
might expect the predictions to be observationally equivalent to the tastes for discrimination 
models: male bosses will typically hire fewer women to positions of power and the women they 
do hire will receive lower wages when they are hired. It is not clear a priori how this would 
operate if there are female bosses, since the outcome will depend on where a female boss’s 
identity lies.  
Using a unique UK data source on academic economists’ labour market experiences, 
Blackaby, Booth and Frank (2005) investigated gender differences in pay and promotions. The 
academic labour market is an excellent source for more general insights on discrimination, since 
there are well-defined ranks so it is clear when an individual has been promoted. In other 
organisations, considerable effort has to be made to infer the actual ranking of different jobs 
(Baker et al., 1994). Moreover, some aspects of productivity – such as publications – are readily 
measurable.
18 Blackaby et al (2005)  found a gender promotions gap and a within-rank gender 
pay gap, controlling for a host of factors including career breaks, best career-publications, and a 
                                                 
17 See Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Booth and van Ours (2009) for empirical evidence of the gender identity 
model in the context of working hours. 
18 With limited exceptions, such as Lazear’s (2000) study of windshield installations, the actual measurement of 
productivity of individuals in either the commercial or public sectors is extremely difficult, particularly for 
managerial workers most likely to have significant promotion opportunities. 11 
 
measure of outside offers. They also found that men receive more outside offers and gain higher 
pay responses. Why might this be the case? On the one hand, universities in the UK are non-
profit institutions, and hence more able to follow tastes for discrimination. But on the other hand, 
the UK government and the EU have adopted a strong position in favour of equal opportunities. 
Blackaby et al. suggested their findings supported the loyal servant hypothesis. Women might be 
less aggressive in asking for pay rises. However the Blackaby et al. results were also consistent 
with a model in which universities are paying women less as a cost-minimising strategy or as a 
taste for discrimination.  
Any rational employer will pay its individual workers as little as it can get away with 
provided productivity is unaffected. But is the gender pay gap declining with the feminization of 
occupation? Albrecht et al. (2003) and Arulampalam et al. (2006) showed that the inclusion of 
occupational and industry controls made little difference to the glass ceiling results with only a 
couple of exceptions. But what about the proportion of women within the organization? Women 
may do better in organisations in which there is already a high proportion of females. They may 
prefer to work with similar individuals; they may gain from mentoring opportunities and they 
may benefit from female networks.
19 
Bell (2005) uses the US ExecuComp dataset, containing information on total compensation 
for the top five highest-paid executives of a large group of US firms for the period 1992-2003, to 
estimate the impact of women-leaders on the careers of other executive women. She finds that 
women executives working in women-led firms earn 15-20% more in total compensation than 
women working in other firms, ceteris paribus. Women-led firms also hire proportionately more 
                                                 
19 Booth and Leigh (2008) in a field experiment involving job applications, found that in female-dominated 
occupations there is a pro-female bias in call-back rates that is increasing with the proportion of women in the 
occupation. Their finding is consistent with the pro-female bias in US secretary applications submitted in the 1970s 
(Levinson 1975) and UK secretary applications submitted in the 2000s (Riach and Rich 2006). 
 12 
 
top women executives. This is consistent with the notion of mentoring or networking by 
women.
20 Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2007), using a panel of linked employer-employee data 
for Portugal, also find that women in female-led firms earn higher wages. However men earn 
lower wages, and a higher share of women reduces the wage level. These findings are interpreted 
as reflecting the importance of promotions for wage increases: if more women are being 
mentored, fewer promotion slots will be available for men but also the expectation of a female 
being promoted will be lower. 
Taking a different approach, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2007) investigate whether or not the 
gender composition of recruiting committees matters. They use data from Spanish public 
examinations for positions in the four main Corps of the Spanish Judiciary, where the allocation 
of 150,000 female and male candidates to evaluating committees is random. This paper is the 
first, to my knowledge, to analyze the degree to which candidates’ success is affected by the 
gender of their evaluators. They found that a female candidate was significantly less likely to be 
hired whenever randomly assigned to a committee with a relatively greater the share of female 
evaluators. Evidence from multiple choice tests suggested that this was due to female majority 
committees overestimating the quality of male candidates. 
Customer preferences may also play a role, as suggested by Becker (1971). Yet relatively 
few studies have addressed this; see Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) for a recent 
summary. An interesting paper by Beckman and Phillips (2005) uses a sample of the largest U.S. 
law firms matched to their publicly traded clients to model the growth rate of women partners as a 
function of whether the corporate client has women in prominent leadership positions. They find 
support for a bargaining power hypothesis whereby law firms promote women when their corporate 
                                                 
20 Bell concludes in favour of “affirmative action at the very top of the corporate hierarchy”.  See Holzer (2007) for 
a survey of studies exploring the effectiveness of affirmative action in the US. 13 
 
clients have women in key leadership positions. These effects are strengthened when the law firm has 
few clients, suggesting that interorganizational influence is stronger when an organization is more 
dependent on its exchange partner. They also interpret their results as supporting a related 
homosocial preferences explanation, or what economists might term nepotism.  
The reader will note that there are some conflicting results in the studies summarised above. 
Much more research remains to be done in reconciling these  For example, we would like to know if 
the differences between studies arise from differences in institutions across countries or across 
occupations, or if instead they arise from differences in the methodologies employed. But maybe 
research explicitly addressing psychological factors can explain some of the anomalies, and to this 
we now turn. 
 
4. Psychological factors and survey-based evidence  
It has been suggested that there might be gender differences in risk aversion, feedback 
preferences or in liking for competition, and that these could potentially have a large impact on 
the supply-side of the labour market. In particular we would like to know if personality 
differences between women and men can explain gender differences in observed outcomes. For 
example, obtaining promotion and pay raises often involves competition, and it may be that 
women do not like to compete but men do. A relatively recent and rapidly growing literature 
attempts to investigate – using either survey or experimental data - if women and men differ 
systematically in some psychological characteristics that might explain the fact that women are 
under-represented in high-paying jobs and high-level occupations. If so, then once these 
differences are controlled for, perhaps the gender pay gap will disappear. 14 
 
We first look at what survey-based evidence has to say about the role of psychological 
factors in affecting gender wage gaps. Clearly the use of contemporaneous survey-based 
measures of risk-aversion, self-esteem and competitive or collaborative behavioural traits is 
dogged by potential endogeneity. However, personality variables are incorporated into the 
analysis of Goldsmith et al. (1997), Bowles et al. (2001), and Mueller and Plug (2004).  Using 
NLSY data, Goldsmith et al. (1997) show that personality variables as well as human capital are 
correlated with wages, but they do not investigate the gender dimension. However, Mueller and 
Plug (2006) do, using a Wisconsin-based survey. While their psychological variables are 
contemporaneous with measured earnings, they nonetheless find interesting correlations between 
measures of personality and earnings. Manning and Swaffield (2008) avoid the endogeneity 
issue by using predetermined psychological information - mainly measured at age 16 - from the 
British Cohort Study to  estimate gender wage gaps at age 30. They find that, on labour market 
entry, there is no gender wage gap for otherwise identical, fully “work-committed” women and 
men (those with no children, no intention of having children, and with continuous full-time work 
experience). However, by age 30 there remains a substantial unexplained gap: women who have 
continuous full-time employment, have had no children and express no desire to have them, earn 
about 8 log points less than equivalent men after 10 years in the labour market. Manning and 
Swaffield then investigate the role of psychological variables in explaining this, focusing on risk 
attitudes, competitiveness, self-esteem, ‘other-regarding’, and career-orientation.
21 The 
psychological variables are found to explain an ‘upper-bound’ of 4.5 log points of the gender 
wage gap. 
                                                 
21 Risk attitudes are proxied by wearing a seat-belt, completion of a first-aid course, smoking and drinking and the 
like, while competitiveness relates to sporting and game activities. The authors are disarmingly frank about the 
difficulties associated with using some of these proxies and the ‘tangential’ nature of some of the variables.   15 
 
Some of these survey-based measures of psychological factors are rather indirect. 
Moreover it is not easy to find measures of psychological factors that are genuinely 
predetermined or that do not change over time. It is therefore of great interest to see if alternative 
methods of data collection can shed light on whether or not there are significant gender 
differences in psychological factors that could explain gender pay gaps and glass ceilings.   
 
5. Experimental studies and personality differences  
5.1 .Summary 
Recent laboratory-based experiments show that, when given the choice of whether or not to enter 
tournaments, women do indeed `shy away from competition' while men might choose to 
compete too much (see inter alia Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003); Datta Gupta, Poulsen, 
and Villeval, 2005; Dohmen and Falk, 2006; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Understanding 
why women seem less inclined than men to compete may provide insight, on the supply-side, 
into why a gender gap still exists in the workplace.  
Gneezy, Leonard and List (2008) explore the role that culture plays in determining 
gender differences in competitive behaviour.  They investigate two distinct societies - the Maasai 
tribe of Tanzania and the Khasi tribe in India. The former is patriarchal while the latter is 
matrilineal. They find that, in the patriarchal society, women are less competitive than men, a 
result that is consistent with the findings of studies using data from Western cultures. But in the 
matrilineal society, women are more competitive than men. Indeed, the Khasi women were 16 
 
found to be as competitive as Maasai men.
22 The authors interpret this as evidence that culture 
has an influence. 
      With the exception of Gneezy et al. (2008), the experimental literature in this area has 
been largely conducted with college-age men and women attending co-educational universities. 
And yet it is well-known that the academic achievement of girls and boys responds differentially 
to co-education, with boys typically performing better and girls worse than in single-sex 
environments (Kessler et al., 1985; Brutsaert, 1999). Moreover, psychologists argue that the 
gendered aspect of individuals' behaviour is brought into play by the gender of others with whom 
they interact ( Maccoby, 1998).  In two papers with Patrick Nolen – see Booth and Nolen (2009a, 
2009b) - we therefore sampled a different subject pool to that normally used in the experimental 
economics literature, in order to investigate the role that single-sex and coeducational schooling 
might play in shaping competitive behaviour and risk-taking.  
Our main conjecture is that schooling can modify preferences in an economically 
important way: in particular, that girls from single-sex schools will have different preferences for 
risk and competition than those from co-ed schools. Studies show that there may be more 
pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are present than for 
boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1990; Brutsaert, 1999). In a coeducational environment, 
girls are more explicitly confronted with adolescent subculture (such as personal attractiveness to 
members of the opposite sex) than they are in a single-sex environment (Coleman, 1961). This 
may lead them to conform to boys' expectations of how girls should behave to avoid social 
rejection (American Association of University Women, 1992). If competitive behaviour or risk 
avoidance is viewed as being a part of female gender identity while risk-seeking is a part of male 
                                                 
22 The experimental task was to toss a tennis ball into a bucket that was placed 3 metres away. A successful shot 
meant that the tennis ball entered the bucket and stayed there. 17 
 
gender identity, then being in a coeducational school environment might lead girls to make less 
competitive and risky choices than boys.  
 
 
5.2. The Design of the Experiment 
In September 2007, students from eight publicly-funded schools in the counties of Essex and 
Suffolk in the UK were conducted in buses to the Colchester campus of the University of Essex 
to participate in a controlled experiment.
23 In Suffolk county there are no single-sex publicly-
funded schools. In Essex county the old single-sex "grammar" schools remain.
24 These grammar 
schools are, like the coeducational schools, publicly funded. We asked participating 
coeducational schools from both Essex and Suffolk to provide students only from the higher-
ability academic stream so that they would be more comparable to the grammar school 
students.
25  
Our subjects were 260 students from years 10 and 11 who were attending either single-
sex or coeducational schools. At no stage were the schools we selected, or the subjects who 
volunteered, told why they were chosen. Four of the schools were single-sex. On arrival, the 
students from each school were randomly assigned into groups of four, which were of three 
                                                 
23  Experimnetal subjects came from two adjacent counties in south-east England, Essex and Suffolk. All the single-
sex schools are in Essex. 
24 In the UK, schools are controlled by local area authorities but frequently "directed" by central government. 
Following the 1944 Education Act, grammar schools became part of the central government's tripatrtite system of 
grammar, secondary modern and technical schools (the latter never got off the ground). By the mid-1960s, the 
central Labour government pressured local authorities to establish "comprehensive" schools in their place. Across 
England and Wales, grammar schools survived in some areas (typically those with long-standing Conservative 
boroughs) but were abolished in most others. In some counties the grammar schools left the state system altogether 
and became independent schools; these are not part of our studies. However, in parts of Essex, single-sex grammar 
schools survive as publicly-funded entities, while in Suffolk they no longer exist. 
25 To compare students of roughly the same ability we recruited from the top part of the distribution in the two 
coeducational schools in Essex: only students in the academic streams were asked to participate. Students from 
Suffolk do not have the option to take the 11+ exam and therefore higher ability students are unlikely to be selected 
out of Suffolk schools in the same way as in Essex. Nonetheless we only recruited students from the academic 
streams in the Suffolk as well. 18 
 
types: all-girls; all-boys; or mixed.  Mixed groups had at least one student of each gender and the 
modal group comprised two boys and two girls. The composition of each group - the appropriate 
mix of single-sex schools, coeducational schools and gender - was determined beforehand. Thus 
only the assignment of the girls or boys from a particular school to a group was random. 
The experiment took place in a large auditorium with 1,000 seats. Students in the same 
group were seated in a row with an empty seat between each. It was easy for subjects to see 
which other students were in the same group. If two students from the same school were 
assigned to a group, they were seated as far apart as possible (for example, in a group of four, 
two other students would sit between the students from the same school). One supervisor, a 
graduate student, was assigned to every five groups. Once the experiment began, students were 
told not to talk, and supervisors enforced this rule.  
 
5.3. Experimental tasks 
At the start of the experiment, students were told that they would be performing a number of 
tasks, one of which would be randomly chosen for payment at the end. Since the payment-round 
was randomly selected ex post, students should maximize their payoff in each round to maximize 
their overall payment. Moreover, students did not have the opportunity to hedge across tasks, as 
only one round was selected for payment.  
Most tasks involved students solving as many of 15 mazes as possible in five minutes.
26 
Before the first task was explained, students were shown a practice maze, given instructions on 
how to solve it, and allowed to ask questions of clarification. Immediately before each round, 
                                                 
26  No student was able to solve all 15 mazes. Mazes were of the type found at 
http://games.yahoo.com/games/maze.html.  The level of difficulty was the easiest of the "Easy to Hard" scale found 
at the bottom right hand side on the webpage. These mazes were also used by a number of other papers in this small 
literature. 19 
 
students were told the nature of the task to be carried out and the payment for that round. At no 
stage were students told how they performed relative to others in their group. While there were 
five rounds in our experiment, I briefly outline here the results of just two – Rounds 3 and 5 (the 
others are discussed in Booth and Nolen, 2009b).
27  
Competitive behaviour was measured by how students’ choices between opting for 
payment via a tournament (winner-takes-all) or by piece-rate in Round 3 of the experiment, as 
will be explained in Section 5.4. For risk, we instead looked at whether or not, in Round 5, 
students’ chose  a real-stakes gamble for the payment mechanism, as will be explained in Section 
5.5.below 
 
5.4. Competitive behaviour 
As in Gneezy et. al. (2003), Datta Gupta et al. (2005) and Niederle and Yestrumskas (2007), we 
measured performance in solving paper mazes to look at competitive behaviour. Round 3 
involved the choice of a Tournament or a Piece Rate. Students were asked to choose either 
Option 1 or Option 2, and that payment would depend on which option they chose if this round 
was randomly selected for payment.  (Option 1 delivered £0.50 per correct maze solved, while 
Option 2 delivered £2 per correct maze IF the individuals solves more mazes than anyone else in 
her group did the previous round and zero otherwise.)
28 Competing against other group-
members' previous round tournament scores removed the strategic element of trying to figure out 
                                                 
27 Round 1 was a mandatory piece-rate (students were told they would each receive £0.50 for each maze solved 
correctly if this round was randomly selected for payment). Round 2 was a mandatory tournament in which students 
were told to solve as many mazes as possible and that, if this round was randomly selected for payment, the group-
winner would receive £2 for each maze solved correctly and the other members zero. We used both these variables 
as controls for ability, learning and the like in later rounds (see Booth and Nolen, 2009b). At the end of the 
experiment, students also completed an exit questionnaire before being paid (both the show-up fee of £5 plus any 
payment from performance in the randomly selected round). 
28 If there was a tie, the winner was chosen at random.  Payments were adjusted according to the size of the group: in 
3-student groups the winner would get £1.50 per maze; in 2-student groups the winner would get £1 per maze. 20 
 
choices other group-members might be making in that round. It also ensured that students did not 
have to consider any externalities their current decisions might impose on other group-members, 
as argued in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).  
Our estimates showed that a girl's environment plays an important role in explaining why 
she chooses not to compete.  We looked at the choices made by girls from single-sex and co-ed 
schools and found that there are robust differences in their behaviour. Ceteris paribus, girls from 
single-sex schools were significantly more likely to choose to enter the tournament than 
coeducational girls.  We also examined the effect of a randomly-assigned environment, being 
placed to an all-girls group for the experiment.  Being in an all-girls group for only 20 minutes 
affected the decision a girl makes and made her more likely to choose to enter the tournament. 
We also compared girls' behaviour with that of boys from single-sex and coeducational schools, 
and found that girls from single-sex schools behaved more like boys. These findings are 
consistent with the gender identity hypothesis and with the education literature that suggest that 
there is greater pressure for girls to maintain their gender identity in schools where boys are 
present than for boys when girls are present (Maccoby, 1998). 
In Booth and Nolen (2009b) we present and extensively discuss a number of sensitivity 
checks. In summary, we found that, across all specifications, the single-sex school coefficient is 
statistically significant in explaining tournament choice even after controlling for family 
background, age, and ability; instrumenting for attendance at a single-sex school or comparing 
single-sex school students to students from Suffolk where selection is not an issue; and even 
when controlling for risk preferences using responses from the post-survey questionnaire.   
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5.5. Choosing the Real-stakes Gamble
29 
In a companion paper, Booth and Nolen (2009a), we investigated if girls are less likely than boys 
to choose a real-stakes gamble. To elicit this, Round 5 of the experiment asked each student to 
choose Option One or Option Two.  Option One was to get £5 for sure.  Option Two was to flip 
a coin and get £11 if the coin came up heads or £2 if the coin came up tails. This round allowed 
us to look at the pure risk aversion differences between girls and boys.
30 Uncertainty exists only 
over the payoff and is unrelated to either ability or to performance in any previous round. The 
expected monetary value of the gamble, £6.50, is higher than the alternative choice, a certain 
outcome of £5. Assuming a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(x)=x
1-σ/(1-σ), where 
σ≥0 is the degree of relative risk aversion, we calculate that the value of σ making an individual 
just indifferent between choosing the gamble and the certain outcome is 0.83. Individuals with 
σ>0.53 will choose the certain outcome, while those with σ<0.83 will choose the gamble. 
The dependent variable takes the value one if the individual chose the gamble and zero 
otherwise. The mean for coed school girls is 0.54 while for single-sex school girls it is 0.86. For 
boys the means are 0.88 and 0.78 for coed and single-sex boys respectively.  
Insert Table 3 near here. 
The marginal effect reported in Column [1] of Table 2 reveals that women are significantly less 
likely to choose the gamble over the safe option than boys. This supports the findings in much of 
the literature. The specification in Column [2] adds controls for school-type and experimental 
group composition.  In this specification the gender gap for girls in coed schools becomes even 
                                                 
29 Eckel and Grossman (2002) provide a summary of gender differences in much of the experimental literature and 
Eckel and Grossman (2008) focus on risk and gender. See also Dohmen and Falk, 2006; and Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner (2006). The latter provide evidence of a gender differential in risk attitudes 
for a representative German sample. 
30 Booth and Nolen (2009b) also report the results from a hypothetical lottery, involving a much larger payoff, 
which was presented to subjects in the post-experiment questionnaire. 22 
 
more obvious; girls now choose to enter the lottery 36 percentage points less than coed boys.  
However, girls in single-sex schools are now just as likely to enter the tournament as boys from 
coed and single-sex schools.  
Column [2] also shows that girls in all-girls groups for the experiment are 12 percentage 
points more likely to enter the lottery than girls in mixed groups, suggesting that girls in same-
gender experimental groups are less risk averse than girls in mixed gender experimental groups.  
However the effect from being in an all-girls group does not cancel out the effect of being female 
and thus it seems that girls in same gender experimental groups do not choose to enter the 
tournament as much as coed boys. The IV results, reported in detail in Booth and Nolen (2009) 
support these findings.  
     
5.7 Summary of our experimental results 
In summary, in our experimental analysis we established at least one setting - in addition to the 
Kasai tribe of India studied by Gneezy et al. (2008) - in which it is untrue that the average female 
avoids competitive or risky behaviour more than the average male. On average girls from single-
sex schools are found in our experiment to be as likely as boys to choose the real-stakes gamble 
and to be as likely as boys to choose competitive behaviour. This suggests that observed gender 
differences in competitive behaviour, and in behaviour under uncertainty, found in previous 
experimental studies might reflect social learning rather than inherent gender traits alone. 
These results matter, not least because of the under-representation of women in high-
paying jobs and top level management positions. While any gender differences in risk aversion 
and the like could explain some of the observed disparities in labour force achievement, gender 
differences in risk aversion are not necessarily innate, as shown by our experiment. Women may 23 
 
be trained to be so by their environment. Appropriate policy action might therefore be directed 
not only to removing discrimination on the demand side but also towards developing female 
confidence in risk-taking and negotiation on the supply side. 
What does this suggest for gender gaps and glass ceilings? First, women educated at 
single-sex schools should be more likely to choose tournaments, which could be considered as 
analogous to promotions. They should also be found in higher levels of management within 
organizations than should coeducated girls. These are testable hypotheses using survey data. 
Second, our findings also suggest that women in gender-segregated groups will be more 
competitive and less risk-averse than in mixed-sex groups. Finally, since the number of single-
sex publicly funded schools in most European countries has been declining, one might also 
expect this could have had some impact on female competitive behaviour over time. 
 
5.  Conclusion    
It is certainly the case that studies using survey-based psychological variables, as well as studies 
using data generated from laboratory experiments, do find gender differences in competitive 
behaviour and risk-taking. These could feed into explaining gender pay gaps and glass ceilings. 
Moreover, the most recent experimental evidence indicates that these gender differences in 
psychological variables are not necessarily innate, a finding that would be hard, if not 
impossible, to show using survey-based evidence alone.  
It is clear that these distinct empirical approaches – involving survey-based data on the 
one hand and data from laboratory or field experiments on the other hand – can enrich our 
understanding of gender differences in behavioural outcomes. Combining the insights from each 
methodology, we now know that some small part of the gender pay gaps and glass ceilings may 24 
 
be due to psychological differences between men and women. However these differences cannot 
be considered innate. They can be shaped by the environment in which individuals are placed. 
The title of this talk was ‘gender and competition’. While the competitive behaviour 
investigated in the recent economics experiments relates at face value to the supply-side of the 
labour market, it could also feed through to the demand side. Whether or not it transfers into the 
largely male corridors of power and into the demand-side of the economy is a largely 
unresearched area. 
The insights from other disciplines about the formation of nepotistic or homosocial 
preferences, gender identity and role incongruity would seem to offer labour economists a 
potentially rewarding way forward. And for those who are interested in understanding how we 
arrived at this point, so too do the political economy approaches as exemplified in the studies by, 
inter alia, John Stuart Mill (1869), Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Doepke and Tertilt  (2008). 
There remains much work to be done by labour economists in exploring the ways in which 





Albrecht J, Bjorklund A and Vroman S. 2003. Is there a glass ceiling in Sweden? Journal of 
Labor Economics Vol. 21:1; 145-177. 
Arulampalam W, Booth AL, and Bryan ML. 2007. Is there a glass ceiling over Europe? 
Exploring the gender pay gap across the wages distribution. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 60(2); 163-186. 
 
Azmat G, Güell M, Manning A. 2006. Gender gaps in unemployment rates in OECD countries. 
Journal of Labor Economics 24; 1–37.  
 
Babcock L, Laschever S. 2003. Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton NJ.  
 25 
 
Bagues MF, Esteve-Volart B. 2007. Can gender parity break the glass ceiling? Evidence from a 
repeated randomized experiment. FEDEA Working Paper No. 2007-15 Madrid.  
 
Baron J, Cobb-Clark D. 2006 A distributional analysis of gender wage differences in Australia 
mimeo Australian National University. Forthcoming The Economic Record.  
 
Becker GS. 1971. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Beckman CM, Phillips DJ. 2005. Interorganizational determinants of promotion: client 
leadership and the attainment of women attorneys. American Sociological Review 70;  
678-701. 
 
Beaman L, Chattopadhyay R, Duffo E, Pande R, Topalova P. 2008. Powerful women: Does 
exposure reduce prejudice? Mimeo Dept of Economics MIT.  
 
Bertrand M, Hallock KF. 2001. The gender gap in top corporate jobs. International Labor 
Relations Review 55(1) 3-21. 
 
Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. 2004. Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal: A field experiment on labor market discrimination. American Economic Review 
94(4); 991-1013. 
Blackaby D,  Booth AL, Frank J. 2005 Outside offers and the gender pay gap. The Economic 
Journal 115; F81-F107. 
Blau FD, Kahn LM. 1992 The gender earnings gap: Learning from international comparisons. 
American Economic Review. 82(2); 533-538.￿
Blau F D, Kahn LM. 1996 Wage structure and gender earnings differentials: an international 
comparison. Economica 63 No. 25 – Supplement: Economic policy and income distribution 
S29-S62. 
Blau FD, Kahn LM. 2003. Understanding international differences in the gender pay gap.   
Journal of Labor Economics, 21(1); 106-144. 
Booth AL, Francesconi M, Frank J. 2003. A sticky floors model of promotion, pay and gender. 
European Economic Review 47(2); 295-322. 
Booth AL, Leigh A. 2008. Do employers discriminate by gender? A field experiment in female-
dominated occupations. Mimeo, Australian National University.  
Booth AL, Nolen PJ. 2009a. Gender differences in risk behaviour: Does nurture matter? IZA DP 
No. 4026.  
Booth AL, Nolen PJ. 2009b. Choosing to compete: How Different Are Girls and Boys? IZA DP 
No. 4027.  
Booth AL, van Ours JC. 2009. Hours of work and gender identity: Does part-time work make the 
family happier? Economica 76 (301); 176–196. 
Brutsaert H. 1999. Coeducation and gender identity formation: A comparative analysis of 
schools in Belgium. British Journal of Sociology of Education 20(3); 343-353.  26 
 
Cardoso AR, Winter-Ebmer R. 2007. Mentoring and segregation: Female-led firms and gender 
wage policies. IZA Discussion Paper No. 3210, December. 
Carlsson M, Rooth D-O. 2007. Evidence of ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labor market 
using experimental data. Labour Economics 14; 716-729. 
Chevalier A. 2004. Motivation, expectations and the gender pay gap for UK graduates. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1101, April 2004. 
Cobb-Clark D. 2001. Getting ahead: The determinants of and payoffs to internal promotion for 
young men and women. Research in Labor Economics 20; 339-372. 
Croson R, Gneezy U. 2004. Gender differences in preferences. Mimeo.  
Datta Gupta N, Oaxaca R, Smith N. 2006. Swimming upstream, floating downstream: 
Comparing women’s relative wage progress in the United States and Denmark. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 59 (2); 243-66. 
Datta Gupta N, Smith N, Verner M. 2006. Child care and parental leave in the Nordic countries: 
A model to aspire to? IZA Discussion Paper No. 2014, March 2006.  
Datta Gupta N, Poulsen A, Villeval MC. 2005. Male and female competitive behaviour: 
Experimental evidence.  IZA DP No. 1833.  
De la Rica S, Dolado JJ, Llorens V. 2008. Ceilings or floors?: Wage gender gaps by education in 
Spain.  Journal of Population Economics 21 (3); 1432-1475.  
Doepke M, Tertilt M. 2008. Women’s liberation: What's in it for men?” NBER Working Paper 
No. W13919. Forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Dohmen TJ, Falk, A (2006). Performance Pay and Multi-Dimensional Sorting: Productivity, 
Preferences and Gender. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2001.  
Dohmen TJ., Falk A, Huffman D, Schupp J, Sunde U, Wagner, GG. 2006. Individual Risk 
Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, Representative, Experimentally-Validated Survey. 
(February). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5517. Forthcoming, Journal of the European 
Economic Association. 
Eagly AH, Karau SJ. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. 
Psychological Review 109 (3); 573–598. 
Eckel C, Grossman P. 2002. Differences in the economic decisions of men and women: 
Experimental evidence. In Handbook of Experimental Results, ed Plott C Smith, V. New 
York: Elsevier. 
Eckel C, Grossman P. 2008. Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using actual and 
forecast gamble choices. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
68(1); 1-17.  
Goldin C. 1990. Understanding the gender gap: An economic history of American women, New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Goldin C, Rouse C. 2000. Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of blind auditions on female 
musicians.  The American Economic Review 90(4); 715-41.  27 
 
Goldin C, Katz L, Kuziemko. 2006. The homecoming of American college women: The reversal 
of the college gender gap. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4); 133-156. 
Goldsmith AH, Veum JR, Darity W Jr. 1997. The impact of psychological and human capital on 
wages. Economic Inquiry Oct 1997; 35 (4); 815-829. 
Ginther D, Kahn S. 2004. Women in economics: Moving up or falling off the academic career 
ladder? Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(3); 193-214. 
Gneezy U, Leonard KL, List JA. 2008. Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence from a 
Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society. Forthcoming in Econometrica. 
Gneezy U, Niederle M, Rustichini A. 2003. Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender 
Differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics; pp. 1049-1074. 
Gneezy U, Rustichini A. 2004. Gender and Competition at a Young Age. American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings, pp.377-381.  
Harrison G, List JA. 2004. Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature 92; 1013-1059. 
Holzer HJ. 2007. The economic impacts of affirmative actions in the U.S. Swedish Economic 
Policy Review 14 (1); 41-71. 
Kanter RM. 1977. Men and women of the corporation. New York: Basic Books.   
Kee HJ. 2006. Glass ceiling or sticky floor? Exploring the Australian gender pay gap. The 
Economic Record 82; 408-427.  
Kessler S, Ashenden DJ, Connell RW, Dowsett GW.1985. Gender relations in secondary 
schooling". Sociology of Education 58 (1); 34-48. 
Landers RM, Rebitzer JB, Taylor LJ. 1996. Rat race redux: Adverse selection in the 
determination of work hours in law firms. American Economic Review 86 (3); 329-348.  
Levinson R. 1975. Sex discrimination and employment practices: An experiment with 
unconventional job inquiries. Social Problems 22; 533-543. 
Lizzeri A, Persico N. 2004. Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of 
government, with an application to Britain’s ‘age of reform’. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 119(2); 707-765.  
Lucifora C, Meurs D. 2004. The public sector pay gap in France, Great Britain and Italy. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1041, Bonn, Germany.  
Maccoby EE. 1998. The two sexes: Growing up apart, coming together. Cambridge Ma: Harvard 
University Press.  
Machado J, Mata J. 2005. Counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using 
quantile regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics 20(4); 445-465. 
Manning, A,  Swaffield J. 2008. The gender gap in early-career wage growth. The Economic 
Journal 118; 983-1024.  
Mill JS. 1869. The Subjection of Women. Longmans, Green and Company.  
Miller P. 2005. The role of gender among low paid and high paid workers. The Australian 
Economic Review 38; 405-17. 28 
 
Mueller G, Plug E. 2006. Estimating the effect of personality on male-female earnings. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 60 (1);  3-22.  
Niederle M, Vesterlund L. 2007. Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too 
much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (3); 1067-1101. 
Niederle M, Yestrumskas AH. 2008. Gender Differences in Seeking Challenges: The Role of 
Institutions. Mimeo, Stanford University. February 2008. 
Oaxaca RL. 1973. Male female wage differentials in urban labor markets. International 
Economic Review 14 (3); 693-709.  
OECD. 2001. Employment Outlook. June 2001. Chapter 4: balancing work and family life: 
helping parents into paid employment. Paris: OECD.  
Pylkkänen E, Smith N. 2004. The impact of family-friendly policies in Denmark and Sweden on 
mothers' career interruptions due to childbirth. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1050. March . 
Riach P, Rich J. 2002. Field experiments of discrimination in the market place. Economic 
Journal 112; F480-F518. 
Riach P, Rich J. 2006. An experimental investigation of sexual discrimination in hiring in the 
english labor market. BE Press Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy 6(2): Article 1. 
Ridgeway CL. 1993. Interaction and the conservation of gender inequality: Considering 
employment. American Sociological Review 62 (2; 218-235. 
Ruhm CJ. 1998. The economic consequences of parental leave mandates: Lessons from Europe. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113; 285-317. 
Seabright P. 2005. Biology and economics of the sex war. The Royal Economic Society 2005 
Lecture. 
Simpson R. 1998. Presenteeism, power and organizational change: Long hours as a career barrier 
and the impact on the working hours of women managers.  British Journal of 
Management 9; 37-50.  
Smith N, Westergaard-Nielsen N. 1988. Wage differentials due to gender, Journal of Population 
Economics 1(2); 115-30. 
Steele CM, Spencer SJ, Aronson J. 2002. Contending with group image: The psychology of 
stereotype and social identity threat. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 34; 379-
440. 
van den Brink M, Lisette C, Benschop Y. 2008. Practising gender in academic gatekeeping: 
Professional recruitment practices in Dutch academia. Paper presented at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting 2008 in Anaheim, USA.  
Waldfogel J. 1998. The family gap for young women in the United States and Britain: Can 
maternity leave make a difference? Journal of Labor Economics 16; 505-545. 
Weichselbaumer D, Winter-Ebmer R. 2007. International gender wage gaps. Economic Policy 





  Table 1: Estimated wage gap, private sector 
 
 Quantile  regression  estimates 
OLS 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Austria  0.251 0.212 0.207 0.215  0.233  0.269 
Belgium  0.144 0.090 0.120 0.144  0.174  0.218 
Britain  0.247 0.201 0.224 0.246  0.272  0.302 
Denmark  0.118 0.045 0.081 0.110  0.163  0.209 
Finland  0.211 0.134 0.165 0.207  0.250  0.284 
France  0.234 0.197 0.174 0.189  0.236  0.294 
Germany  0.162 0.139 0.142 0.146  0.159  0.200 
Ireland  0.230 0.185 0.215 0.240  0.256  0.269 
Italy  0.172 0.156 0.138 0.146  0.169  0.205 
Netherlands  0.127 0.029 0.068 0.107  0.172  0.249 
Spain  0.211 0.214 0.211 0.207  0.202  0.205 
Source: Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2007) and ECHP data.  
Notes: (a) Regressions include controls for training, age, education, tenure, marital status, health, unemployment 
experience, part-time, fixed term & casual contracts, region (where possible), sector, year. (b) All reported 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Probability of choosing the gamble in Round 5 
 
Variables     [1]     [2]  
 
Female 
 
 
‐0.16*** 
(0.05) 
 
‐0.36*** 
(0.07) 
 
Attends single‐sex school  
 
 
 
‐0.13 
(0.10) 
 
Female*Attends single‐sex school 
 
  0.33*** 
(0.06) 
 
Allocated to all‐girls group 
 
  0.12* 
(0.06) 
 
Allocated to all‐boys group 
 
 ‐ 0.05 
(0.10) 
 
 
Observations 
 
260 
 
260 
 
Model type   Probit  Probit  
Notes:  
i.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
ii.  * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, ***at 1% level. 
iii.  Source: Booth and Nolen (2009a), first two columns of their Table 2.
 
 
 